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THE ICC AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL: HOW MUCH SUPPORT IS THERE FOR ENDING
IMPUNITY?
Stuart Ford

I.

INTRODUCTION

This past year (2014) was not a good one for the International Criminal Court (ICC). The
event that received the most attention was the collapse of the case against Uhura Kenyatta, the
President of Kenya.1 Mr. Kenyatta had been accused of being criminally responsible for murder,
rape, and persecution committed during post-election violence in Kenya.2 In early December 2014,
Fatou Bensouda, the ICC’s Prosecutor, withdrew charges against Mr. Kenyatta, claiming that the
Kenyan government’s refusal to cooperate had made it too difficult to obtain evidence against
him.3 This led Professor Kontorovich to argue that the ICC’s goal of ending impunity for serious
violations of international criminal law is a utopian dream that cannot be achieved given the current
state of the world.4 The dismissal of the case against Kenyatta does, indeed, raise serious questions,
but Professor Dutton addresses the ramifications of the Kenyatta case in more detail.5
At almost the same time as the withdrawal of charges against Mr. Kenyatta, something else
happened that received much less press coverage but may ultimately be as important to the future



Associate Professor of Law at the John Marshall Law School in Chicago, Illinois, USA. This Article was greatly
improved by the comments of Professor Yvonne Dutton, who read an earlier version. Priyavathi Reddy provided
research assistance.
1
See Marlise Simmons & Jeffrey Gettleman, International Court Ends Case Against Kenyan President in Election
Unrest, NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 5, 2014 at 1.
2
See Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber II, at para. 428 (Jan. 23, 2012). Id. at 5 (explaining Mr.
Kenyatta was also accused of other crimes against humanity, including forcible transportation and inhumane acts) .
3
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, ICC-01/09-02/11-983, Notice of withdrawal of the charges against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta,
at para. 1 (Dec. 5, 2014).
4
See Eugene Kontorovich, A Court’s Collapse, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Sept. 15, 2014, at 7.
5
See Yvonne M. Dutton, Enforcing the Rome Statute: Evidence of (Non) Compliance from Kenya, 26 INDIANA INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 11-12 (2015).
http://dx.doi.org/10.18060/7909.0036
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of the court. On December 12, 2014, Ms. Bensouda appeared before the United Nations (UN)
Security Council to update them on the progress of the ICC’s investigations in Darfur. She told
the Council that conditions had worsened in Darfur and that crimes within the court’s jurisdiction
were occurring, including the widespread commission of rape and other sexual crimes. She went
on to note that those indicted by the court continue to evade arrest.6 Then, in a stunning admission
of defeat, she told the Security Council that she was suspending the investigation into events in
Darfur and shifting the court’s resources to other situations:
It is becoming increasingly difficult for me to appear before you and purport to be
updating you when all I am doing is repeating the same things I have said over and
over again. . . . Given this council’s lack of foresight on what should happen in
Darfur, I am left with no choice but to hibernate investigative activities in Darfur
as I shift resources to other urgent cases.7
The government of Sudan promptly declared victory: “The Sudanese people have defeated the
ICC and have refused to hand over any Sudanese to the colonialist courts.”8
The suspension of the ICC’s investigations in Darfur raises important questions about the
court and its relationship with the Security Council. Can the court succeed without the Security
Council’s assistance? Why is the Security Council paralyzed? Is this situation likely to change?
How much support is there for ending impunity in the Security Council and beyond? What do
states mean when they say they support the ICC? By examining what states, both members of the

6

See Office of the Prosecutor, Twentieth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN
Security Council Pursuant to UNSC 1593 (2005), at para. 1 (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/20-UNSC-Darfur-OTP.aspx (last visited Dec.
15, 2014). [http://perma.cc/DH6R-3DV5].
7
BBC News, ICC Prosecutor Shelves Darfur War Crimes Inquiries, BBC NEWS, 1 (Dec. 12, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30458347 (last visited Dec. 15, 2014) [http://perma.cc/8YZN-D5PB].
8
Shadi Bushra, Sudan’s Bashir Claims Victory Over ICC After Court Shelves Darfur Probe, REUTERS (Dec. 13,
2014), http://www reuters.com/article/2014/12/13/us-sudan-icc-bashir-idUSKBN0JR0K520141213 (last visited Dec.
15, 2014) [http://perma.cc/XX6Q-H7UV].
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Security Council and the broader membership of the General Assembly, have said recently about
the ICC and impunity, I hope to draw some conclusions about the likelihood of long-term success
for the ICC.
II.

BACKGROUND

While Sudan has had a history of conflict, violence and autocratic rule since it obtained
independence, the conflict in Darfur began in late 2002 or early 2003 when rebel groups began an
armed insurgency against Sudanese government forces.9 The government responded with a
campaign of indiscriminate attacks on villages in Darfur that killed tens of thousands of civilians
and resulted in widespread torture, rape, and the destruction of property.10 The attacks tended to
follow a common pattern, with villages being attacked by a combination of Sudanese government
soldiers driving vehicles and Janjaweed fighters riding horses and camels.11 In some instances, the
attacks were supported by helicopters and planes operated by the Sudanese armed forces.12 The
attackers would kill civilians, including women and children, burn houses, schools, and hospitals,
and destroy wells.13 They would then steal any movable property, including livestock, before
leaving.14 Several hundred thousand people died during the first several years of the conflict,15 and
the widespread destruction of villages caused approximately two million Darfurians to flee the
violence.16 The UN-appointed International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur investigated the

Report of the Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General at paras. 62-63, UN Doc.
No. S/2005/60 (Jan. 25, 2005).
10
Id. at ¶¶ 184-186, 238-240.
11
Id. at ¶ 242.
12
Id. at ¶ 243.
13
Id. at ¶ 242.
14
Id.
15
See BBC News, Darfur Deaths Could be 300,000’, BBC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7361979.stm (noting that while the government of Sudan estimated that there had
been 10,000 deaths, the World Health Organization had estimated that more than 200,000 people had died in Darfur)
[http://perma.cc/S2EM-FPUX].
16
Report of the Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 9, at ¶¶ 226, 229-230.
9
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situation on behalf of the international community and concluded that the government of Sudan
was responsible for acts that “very likely” constituted war crimes and crimes against humanity.17
In March 2005, the Security Council responded with a resolution that found the violence
in Sudan constituted a threat to international peace and security, and “refer[red] the situation in
Darfur . . . to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.”18 It also “decide[d] that the
Government of Sudan . . . shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the
Court and the Prosecutor. . . .”19 The resolution passed with eleven affirmative votes and four
abstentions. At the time, simply obtaining Security Council approval for a referral was considered
a success20 given U.S. opposition to the court.21
Shortly after Resolution 1593, the Prosecutor opened a formal investigation into the
ongoing violence in Darfur.22 In July 2008, the Prosecutor requested an arrest warrant be issued
for Omar Al Bashir, the President of Sudan.23 Several months later, Pre-Trial Chamber I granted
the request.24 Before doing so, it reviewed the information submitted by the Prosecution in support
of the arrest warrant, and concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that President
Bashir was criminally responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in
Darfur.25

17

Id. A t¶ 630.
S.C. Res. 1593, UN Doc. No. S/RES/1593 (2005), at para. 1 (Mar. 31, 2005).
19
Id. at ¶ 2.
20
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The ICC – Quo Vadis?, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 421, 425 (2006) (noting that the referral
“engendered much initial euphoria”).
21
See, e.g., Corrina Heyder, The U.N. Security Council’s Referral of the Crimes in Darfur to the International
Criminal Court in Light of U.S. Opposition to the Court: Implications for the International Criminal Court’s Functions
and Status, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 650, 660-661 (2006) (describing U.S. opposition to the ICC).
22
Press Release from Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, ICC, The Prosecutor of the ICC opens investigation
in Darfur, Doc. No. ICC-OTP-0606-104 (2005).
23
Public Redacted Version of the Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58, Doc. No. ICC-02/05-157-AnxA, 1, 112
(July 14, 2008).
24
See Prosecutor v. Bashir, Doc. No. ICC-02/05-01/09-1, Warrant of Arrest (Mar. 4, 2009).
25
Id.
18
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The ICC eventually issued arrest warrants against a number of senior Sudanese government
officials for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the conflict in Darfur. In
each case, the Pre-Trial Chamber reviewed the evidence submitted by the Prosecutor and
concluded that there was reasonable grounds to believe that the accused person was criminally
responsible for acts within the jurisdiction of the court.26 These included warrants for the arrest of
Ahmad Muhammad Harun, the former Minister of the Interior, and Abdel Raheem Muhammad
Hussein, the current Minister of Defense.27 And then, nothing happened.
III.

THE CURRENT SITUATION

Nearly ten years has passed since the Security Council’s referral of Darfur to the ICC, yet
there has been almost no tangible progress. The violence in Darfur has not stopped and government
forces continue to engage in indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks against civilians.28 Rather
than improving over time, the situation in Darfur actually worsened in 2014.29 Moreover, the most
recent round of peace talks between the government of Sudan and various rebel groups collapsed
in early December.30 And the UN peacekeeping force in Darfur is set to shrink or even disappear,
despite the increasing violence31 because the peacekeepers have found it virtually impossible to be

26

See Rome Statute, Art. 58(1) (July 1, 2002) (requiring the Pre-Trial Chamber to examine the information submitted
by the Prosecutor and determine whether there are “reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court” before issuing an arrest warrant).
27
Int’l Crim. Ct., Situation in Darfur, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Mar. 1, 2012) http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/Pages/situation%20icc0205.aspx (last visited December 16, 2014) [http://perma.cc/MQ9D-WBUN].
28
See U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7337th Mtg. at 3, UN Doc. No. S/PV.7337 (Dec. 12, 2014) (“My Office’s factual
indicators seem to illustrate a similar pattern of indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks against civilians by the
Rapid Support Forces.”).
29
See Id. at 2 (noting in her presentation to the Security Council, the Prosecutor noted that “the situation in Darfur
continue[s] to deteriorate.”).
30
Sudan: Peace Talks End Without Deal, NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 10, 2014, at A8.
31
See Somini Sengupta and Jeffrey Gettleman, U.N. Set to Cut Force in Darfur as Fighting Rises, NEW YORK TIMES,
Dec. 24, 2014, at A8.

37

IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.

38

[Vol 26:1

effective in the face of attacks by Sudanese forces and their proxies and the hostility of the
Sudanese government.32
None of the indicted members of the government of Sudan have been handed over to the
ICC. Indeed, the government of Sudan considers it a victory that it has been able to frustrate
attempts to arrest the indictees.33 ICC officials have never been permitted to conduct investigations
in Sudan.34 The government of Sudan refuses to communicate with the court and simply returns
the court’s correspondence unopened.35 And the indicted officials, including President Omar Al
Bashir, continue to make state visits to other countries.36 At this stage, the Sudanese government
can plausibly declare victory over the international community.
Thus, it was disheartening but unsurprising to hear the Prosecutor admit defeat. Now, it is
true that it was not a complete defeat. The arrest warrants will continue to be in effect. And there
is no statute of limitations for serious violations of international criminal law. 37 Thus, so long as
the accused are alive there is the possibility that they will be arrested and stand trial. Moreover,
the Prosecutor’s language — she said the investigations would be put “on hold” rather than ended38
— indicates that she could reopen her investigations later, if the circumstances change.
Nevertheless, her decision to suspend the investigations was an admission that the success of the
ICC’s work in Darfur is almost entirely out of its hands. It depends on either a regime change in

32

Id.
See Bushra, supra note 8.
34
See Cécile Aptel Williamson, Justice empowered or justice hampered: The International Criminal Court in Darfur,
15 AFR. SECURITY REV. 20, 25-26 (2006) (noting that ICC investigators had not been allowed into Sudan). See also
Victor Peskin, Caution and Confrontation in the International Criminal Court’s Pursuit of Accountability in Uganda
and Sudan, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 655, 667 (2009).
35
Twentieth Report of the Prosecutor, supra note6, at ¶ 8.
36
See Twentieth Report of the Prosecutor, supra note6, at ¶ 10 (explaining that during the second half of 2014, Bashir
traveled to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Ethiopia).
37
See, e.g., Rome Statute, Art. 29 (July 1, 2002) (“The crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be subject
to any statute of limitations.”).
38
See U.N. SCOR, 6th Sess., supra note 27, at 2.
33
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Sudan that brings to power a government willing to cooperate, or much more muscular action by
the Security Council to compel the existing Sudanese regime to cooperate. As things stand, neither
seems likely in the short term.
IV.

THE ICC HAS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS AND
PROSECUTIONS ARISING OUT OF THE VIOLENCE IN DARFUR

The legal issues that arise out of the relationship between the ICC and the Security Council
are relatively straightforward: the ICC has the necessary legal authority to succeed. Unfortunately,
as the ICC’s experience with Darfur shows, legal authority is at best only weakly connected to
success. First of all, the Rome Statute gives the Security Council the authority to refer matters to
the ICC, and this serves as a proper jurisdictional basis for the court to investigate the situation,39
although using this authority may not always be a good idea.40 Next, the Security Council has
authority under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to take measures not including the use
of armed force to resolve threats to international peace and security. 41 This includes the authority
to subject Sudan to the jurisdiction of the court against its will and to order Sudan to cooperate
with the court.42 Thus, there is little doubt that the referral was lawful, the ICC properly has

39

See Luigi Condorelli & Annalisa Ciampi, Comments on the Security Council Referral of the Situation in Darfur to
the ICC, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 590, 592 (2005) (addressing the Security Council’s referral of the situation in Darfur
to the ICC was consistent with Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, which permits the Court to exercise jurisdiction
when a situation is “referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations.”).
40
See Louise Arbour, The Relationship Between the ICC and the UN Security Council, 20 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:
REV. MULTILATERALISM & INT’L ORGS. 195, 198 (2014) (arguing that the ICC’s “legitimacy hinges to a large degree
on voluntary acceptance of its complementarity jurisdiction” and that “Security Council referrals, by their nature a
political and coercive measure, threaten to undermine the voluntary acceptance” of the court’s jurisdiction).
41
U.N. Charter, art. 41.
42
Dapo Akande, The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its Impact on Al Bashir′s Immunities,
7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 333, 335 (2009) (noting that Sudan is not a member of the Rome Statute and would not, absent
the Security Council resolution, have any obligation to cooperate with the ICC). See infra note 45 (noting that Article
86 of the Rome Statute imposes an obligation on member states to cooperate with the court).
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jurisdiction over the situation in Darfur, and Sudan is legally obligated to cooperate with the
court.43
The Security Council also possesses the authority to compel other states to cooperate with
the ICC as part of its investigation in Darfur.44 However, Resolution 1593 did not compel such
cooperation. Rather, it simply “urge[d]” other states to cooperate.45 This language, when used in
Security Council Resolutions, is aspirational rather than mandatory.46 On the other hand, the Rome
Statute imposes a general obligation upon members to cooperate with the court.47 The result is that
Sudan is obligated to cooperate by virtue of Resolution 1593, while other members of the Rome
Statute are obligated to cooperate by virtue of Article 86 of the Rome Statute. Non-member states,
other than Sudan, are not obligated to do anything, although the Security Council did “urge” them
to cooperate.
V.

SO WHY HAS THE ICC MADE SO LITTLE PROGRESS IN DARFUR?

As a matter of law, the ICC has most of what it needs to conduct its investigations and
obtain custody of the accused — most notably jurisdiction over the situation and a Security Council
Resolution requiring Sudan to cooperate. In practice, however, the legal issues have proved to be
relatively unimportant compared to the political issues. This was recognized early on by a number
of commentators. For example, Cherif Bassiouni, writing in 2006, described the Darfur referral as
a “near mission impossible” because of the expected lack of political support from the Security
Council and the likelihood that Sudan would not cooperate with the court.48

43

See Condorelli & Ciampi, supra note 38, at 592-593.
Id. at 593 (noting that the Security Council could have used the authority granted to it under Article 41 of the United
Nations Charter to obligate all states to cooperate with the ICC); Heyder, supra note 20, at 655 (“Under Article 41,
the Security Council could adopt a resolution compelling all member states to give full effect to the Security Council's
decision to refer the Sudan case to the ICC.”).
45
S.C. Res. 1593, UN Doc. No. S/RES/1593 (2005), at ¶ 2 (Mar. 31, 2005).
46
See Condorelli & Ciampi, supra note 38, at 593.
47
See Rome Statute, Art. 86 (July 1, 2002).
48
See M. Cherif Bassiouni, The ICC – Quo Vadis?, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 421, 425-426 (2006).
44
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Ms. Bensouda laid the blame for the failure of the court’s work in Darfur at the feet of
Sudan and the Security Council. First, the Prosecutor blamed Sudan for its refusal to cooperate:
[T]he Government of Sudan . . . has the primary responsibility and is able to fully
implement the Court’s warrants of arrest consistent with its sovereign authority.
Notwithstanding this clear responsibility, it has consistently failed to do so. At the
same time, it has also failed to provide any meaningful measure of justice at the
national level.49
Next, the Prosecutor blamed the Security Council. She said that not once in ten years had the
Security Council taken any concrete action to help the ICC succeed in Darfur.50 And she told the
Council that “unless there is a clear change of attitude and approach to Darfur in the near future,”
it was unlikely that the situation would change.51 She said that the continued deterioration of the
situation in Darfur should “shock” the Council into action.52 Essentially she conceded that, without
a dramatic change of heart by either the Council or Sudan, the ICC is unable to succeed in Darfur.
Of course, the Security Council has the authority to act to support the ICC. Sudan is in
violation of its obligation to cooperate under Resolution 1593.53 Resolution 1593 was issued under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter after a finding by the Council that the situation in Darfur
is a threat to international peace and security. The continuing violence suggests that it is still a
threat to international peace and security. This means the Council could take a variety of actions
to respond to Sudan’s intransigence. These actions could range from formally finding Sudan to be
in violation of its legal obligations under Resolution 1593, through the imposition of sanctions, all

49

See Record of the 7337th Mtg., supra note 27, at 3.
Id. at 2.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
See Akande, supra note 41, at 335.
50

41
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the way up to the authorization of the use of force against Sudan.54 Just as clearly, the Security
Council will do none of these things at the present time.
A. THE THREAT OF A RUSSIAN OR CHINESE VETO
The debate that followed the Prosecutor’s dramatic announcement that she was suspending
investigations in Darfur highlighted the divides among the Security Council’s members. Ten states
expressed support for the ICC, lamented the Security Council’s paralysis, and criticized Sudan’s
refusal to cooperate. These were Australia,55 Jordan,56 the United Kingdom,57 Luxembourg,58
Argentina,59 the United States,60 Lithuania,61 South Korea,62 Chile,63 and France.64 Their language
was clear and unequivocal. For example, the Australian representative said that the Council had
“failed the victims of Darfur,”65 while the representative of Luxembourg said that the ICC needed
the “decisive support” of the Security Council,66 and the French representative urged the Council
to ensure that the ICC’s arrest warrants were executed.67 The U.S. representative called the
Council’s inaction a “travesty” and urged the Council to “wake from [its] slumber.”68
The African states on the Security Council, on the other hand, were ambivalent about the
ICC. The Nigerian representative, for example, condemned the violence in Darfur and called for

54

See Christopher D. Totten & Nicholas Tyler, Arguing for an Integrated Approach to Resolving the Crisis in Darfur:
The Challenges of Complementarity, Enforcement, and Related Issues in the International Criminal Court, 98 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1069, 1110-1112 (2008).
55
See Record of the 7337th Mtg., supra note 27, at 3-4.
56
Id. at 6.
57
Id. at 7.
58
Id. at 7-8.
59
Id. at 9-11.
60
See Record of the 7337th Mtg., supra note 27, 11-13.
61
Id. at 13.
62
Id. at 13-14.
63
Id. at 14.
64
Id. at 15-16.
65
See Record of the 7337th Mtg., supra note 27, at 4.
66
Id. at 8.
67
Id. at 16.
68
Id. at 13.

2016]

THE ICC AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

43

peace, but did not express support for the ICC or criticize the Sudanese government’s lack of
cooperation.69 Chad’s representative did likewise, condemning the violence as a general matter,
but hardly mentioning the ICC or Sudan’s cooperation with the court.70 The Rwandan delegate
complained that the Security Council had refused to defer the proceedings against Bashir as
requested by a number of African states71 and that “continued reports of non-cooperation by
African States” were counterproductive.72 Underlying this ambivalence is a concern among some
African states that the ICC’s focus on African problems shows that it has become a tool of great
power politics.73
Russia and China were even less supportive. The Russian delegate blamed the violence on
“warring tribes” rather than the government of Sudan, praised the Sudanese government for its
alleged attempts to maintain peace, and criticized the United States for imposing sanctions on
Sudan.74 More generally, Russia opposes any action by the Security Council against Sudan.75 The
Chinese delegate praised the Sudanese government for its efforts to “advance the political
reconciliation process” and conspicuously did not call for Sudan to cooperate with the ICC.76 In
fact, the Chinese delegate only mentioned the ICC once in his presentation — when noting that
the Chinese position regarding “the handling of the Darfur issue by the International Criminal

69

Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 16.
71
The Rome Statute grants to the Security Council the right to defer ICC proceedings for a period of one year by
passing a resolution under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. See Rome Statute, Art. 16. A number of African
states have asked for a deferral of the ICC’s proceedings in Darfur, but the Security Council has not done so. See
Charles C. Jalloh, Dapo Akande, & Max du Plessis, Assessing the African Union Concerns about Article 16 of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 4 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 5, 7-8 (2011).
72
See Record of the 7337th Mtg., supra note 27, at 9.
73
See Jalloh et al., supra note 71.
74
See Record of the 7337th Mtg., supra note 27, at 5.
75
See Somini Sengupta and Jeffrey Gettleman, U.N. Set to Cut Force in Darfur as Fighting Rises, NEW YORK TIMES,
Dec. 25, 2014 (noting that Russia “staunchly backs the Bashir government” and the existence of “Russian resistance”
to action by the Security Council) [http://perma.cc/D6A5-TXHD].
76
See Record of the 7337th Mtg., supra note 27, at 8.
70

43
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Court remains unchanged.”77 While he did not spell out that position explicitly, China’s position
is that it will veto any resolution that pressures Sudan to cooperate with the ICC.78
Despite the Security Council’s paralysis, it is important to recognize that there is
considerable support for the ICC and that the paralysis essentially comes down to the threat of a
Russian or Chinese veto. Even if we assume the African states would vote against Security Council
action rather than simply abstain, the number of states on the Security Council supporting the ICC
outnumbers those who would vote against it ten to five. Thus, there are sufficient votes to pass a
Security Council resolution providing support to the ICC, if there were no permanent member
veto.79 However, those who oppose Security Council action include Russia and China, both of
whom wield the veto.80 As a result, the Security Council is paralyzed and will not take any action
to support the ICC or pressure Sudan to cooperate. Nor is this the only recent situation in which
the threat of a veto has paralyzed the Council. The vote on referral of the situation in Syria to the
ICC in May 2014 broke down along similar lines. Thirteen of the fifteen Security Council members
supported referral, but the measure was vetoed by Russia and China.81
It would be wrong to conclude from the Security Council’s paralysis in Darfur and Syria
that the Security Council is opposed to action to end impunity. There is, in fact, broad support for

77

Id.
See ICC Charges Against Uhuru Kenyatta Defended by Ocampo, BBC NEWS AFRICA (Dec. 16, 2014, 08:19 AM),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30498266 (“China is an ally of Sudan in the UN Security Council, and is
bound to veto any action against [President Bashir], correspondents say.”); Giorgio Cafiero, China’s Sudan Challenge,
FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS (Feb. 7, 2013), http://fpif.org/chinas_sudan_challenge/ (“China’s veto power has provided
the Sudanese regime with impunity at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Beijing’s threat to veto all
resolutions targeting Sudan has empowered Bashir’s regime to pursue its aggressive policies in Darfur without the
threat of economic sanctions being imposed by the UNSC.”) [http://perma.cc/2XEU-XN4A].
79
See UN Charter, art. 27(3) (noting that Security Council decisions need affirmative votes by nine members but also
require “the concurring votes of the permanent members”).
80
See UN Charter, art. 23(1) (noting that Russia and China are permanent members of the Security Council).
81
See Record of the 7180th Mtg., UN Doc. No. S/PV.7180, dated May 22, 2014, at 4 (noting that China and Russia
voted against the draft resolution referring the situation in Syria to the ICC while the other thirteen members of the
Security Council voted in favor of it).
78
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the ICC within the Council. Opposition to action, on the other hand, is narrow. Essentially, the
opposition consists of Russia and China, and, absent the permanent member veto, the Security
Council would already have acted in Sudan and Syria.
B.

BROAD SUPPORT FOR THE ICC IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

There is also considerable support for the ICC among the membership of the UN as a
whole. On October 23, 2014, the Security Council held an open debate on the functioning of the
Security Council and cooperation with the ICC.82 Thirty-four countries urged greater Security
Council support for the ICC.83 Thirty-one countries spoke in support of limiting the permanent
member veto in situations of mass atrocities.84 Moreover, a number of countries that spoke in
support of the ICC, did so on behalf of coalitions of states. For example, Switzerland spoke on
behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group (ACT). ACT is a group of
twenty-three states that supports both the ICC and limiting the permanent member veto. 85 Saint
Lucia spoke on behalf of the “L.69 group,” a group of 42 developing countries that supports
“comprehensive reform” of the Security Council.86 Although the representative from Saint Lucia
did not specifically mention the ICC, reforming the Security Council to limit or remove the
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permanent member veto would effectively empower the Security Council to support the ICC.87 In
other words, there is broad support among UN member states for changes that would remove the
permanent member roadblock and permit the Council to support the ICC.88
In contrast, only four states were openly critical of the ICC or the Security Council’s
relationship with the ICC: Russia, Rwanda, Chad, and Egypt.89 The Russian delegate, for example,
argued that the Security Council was already cooperating sufficiently with the ICC as evidenced
by the fact that the Security Council permitted the Prosecutor to address it regularly.90 He went on
to suggest that the problem of Sudanese non-cooperation was the court’s fault for trying to bring
to justice senior public officials of states.91 The Rwandan delegate chastised the Council for failing
to take any action on the request by African states for a deferral of the ICC’s proceedings in Darfur,
although he also said that Rwanda remained committed to “ensur[ing] accountability for the most
serious crimes.”92 The representatives from Chad and Egypt echoed Rwanda’s concerns about
deferral of the ICC’s investigations in Darfur.93 The Chinese delegate was ambiguous rather than
overtly critical (“We believe that the ICC’s efforts to seek justice should take into account the
urgent needs of maintaining regional peace and stability”94) but in practice, China is opposed to
action by the Security Council to support the ICC.
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See supra text accompanying notes 79-81 (noting that absent a permanent member veto, the Security Council would
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ICC, had sixty-six sponsors and passed by consensus).
89
See infra text accompanying notes 90-93.
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See Record of the 7285th Mtg., UN Doc. No. S/PV.7285, dated Oct. 23, 2014, at 12.
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Id. at 14-15.
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October 23, 2014, at 31.
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See Record of the 7285th Mtg., UN Doc. No. S/PV.7285, dated Oct. 23, 2014, at 11.
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The debate demonstrates that the positions of states within the General Assembly are quite
similar to the positions of states within the Security Council. A clear majority of states spoke in
favor of supporting the ICC and very few states spoke against it.95 Nor was the court’s support
limited to Western democracies. While most European states urged support for the ICC, so did
many Central and South American states (including Costa Rica,96 Guatemala,97 Chile,98 Mexico,99
Uruguay,100 Argentina,101 and Brazil102) as well as a number of Asian states (including South
Korea103 and Japan104).
The position of African states warrants particular study because, apart from Russia and
China, opposition to the ICC appears to come largely from African states. Rwanda, Chad, and
Egypt all criticized the Council’s refusal to defer the proceedings in Darfur,105 but not all African
states were negative about the court. Three African states were neutral (Morocco, Algeria, and
Côte d’Ivoire),106 while two states, Nigeria and Botswana, called for greater support for the ICC.107
Moreover, even Rwanda and Egypt, two of the African states that were critical of the ICC,
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99
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nevertheless called for a limit on the permanent member veto in situations involving mass
atrocities.108 And Rwanda, the most critical state, reaffirmed that it was committed to ending
impunity for mass atrocities.109
In effect, it appears that African views about the ICC’s involvement in Darfur are mixed,
with some states opposed, some neutral and some states in favor of supporting the ICC. The
positions of African states match up fairly closely with whether they are members of the Rome
Statute. Of the states that have criticized the ICC, Chad is a member of the Rome Statute, while
Rwanda and Egypt are not.110 Of the states that were neutral, Côte d’Ivoire is a member state,
while Morocco and Algeria are not.111 Both states that were supportive of the ICC (Nigeria and
Botswana) are members of the Rome Statute.112 Given that there are thirty-four African states that
are members of the Rome Statute,113 this suggests that the majority of African states are probably
still (quietly) supportive of the ICC, even if a vocal minority is critical of it. Moreover, even those
African states that are critical of the ICC’s involvement in Darfur claim to be broadly supportive
of ending impunity and lifting the stranglehold imposed by the permanent member veto.114
Further, there is some reason to believe that African states view the situation in Darfur as
something of a special case. For example, all three of the African members of the Security Council
at the time (Chad, Rwanda, and Nigeria) voted in favor of draft Security Council referral of the
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situation in Syria to the ICC.115 It is notable that Rwanda, the fiercest African critic of the ICC’s
handling of the situation in Darfur, was nonetheless willing to support the referral of the situation
in Syria.116 This suggests that African opposition may be specific to Darfur rather than a
generalized opposition to the ICC.
The positions of states during the attempt to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC show a
similar pattern. The draft resolution that China and Russia vetoed117 had sixty-five sponsors.118
That support came from all over the world including many states in Europe, Central and South
America, Africa, and the Middle East. Once again, Africa deserves special attention. Seven of the
measure’s sixty-five sponsors were African states: Botswana, the Central African Republic, Côte
d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Senegal, and the Seychelles. 119 Six of
these seven countries (all but Libya) are also state parties to the Rome Statute.120 So, while Rwanda
and a few other African states have been outspoken in their criticism of the court’s investigation
in Darfur, it appears the majority of African states, particularly those that are ICC members, are
still generally supportive of the ICC.
In short, there is ample evidence that support for the ICC is broad, while opposition to the
court is narrow. This level of support for the court is not surprising given that there are 122 state
parties to the Rome Statute.121 To put that in perspective, there are only 193 members in the entire

115

See supra note 79.
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United Nations.122 This means that more than 60% of all states are ICC members and thus
presumably supporters of the ICC. Unfortunately, the states that oppose the ICC include China
and Russia, both of which can use their veto power to block Security Council action. The result
has been paralysis by the Council.
VI.

THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The key players in the relationship between the ICC and the Security Council are the
permanent members. As shown above, but for the threat of a permanent member veto, it is likely
that the Security Council would have already acted to support the ICC. Thus, understanding their
motivations may make it easier to predict the future of relations between the Council and the court.
For this purpose, I will use the framework developed by Professor Bosco in his book Rough
Justice.123 He argues that states will adopt one of three strategies for dealing with the ICC —
marginalization, control, or acceptance.124 States may try to marginalize the court by attacking the
court’s legitimacy or trying to prevent other states from supporting it.125 Another strategy is for
states to try and control the court to ensure that it undertakes activities the state wants while
avoiding those it does not want.126 This could be accomplished by conditioning state support on
whether the court’s actions are consistent with the state’s interests. Finally, states can accept the
court, which would entail consistently supporting the court even when its actions do not serve the
state’s political interests.127
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Britain and France are both firm supporters of the ICC and are often seen as the court’s
strongest allies on the Council.128 They are parties to the Rome Statute and speak regularly in
support of the ICC.129 The United Kingdom describes itself as “a strong supporter of international
justice in general and of the International Criminal Court in particular.”130 Unlike Russia and
China, who talk about balancing peace and justice, the United Kingdom takes the position that
there cannot be lasting peace without justice131 and has urged all states to become members of the
ICC.132 France similarly seems to favor justice in the peace vs. justice debate133 and has taken the
unusual step of promoting a “code of conduct” between the permanent members under which they
would agree not to veto resolutions in situations where mass atrocities are being committed.134
France and the United Kingdom also appear to be willing to go farther than most countries in
taking concrete action to support the ICC.135 In Professor Bosco’s framework, France and the
United Kingdom have accepted the ICC.136
The United States was initially quite hostile to the ICC,137 even though it abstained from
Resolution 1593 rather than vetoing it.138 For example, President Bush “officially nullified the
Clinton administration’s signature of the Rome Statute” and discontinued participation in ICC
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meetings.139 His ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton, characterized the ICC as a threat
to fundamental American values.140 Despite this initial hysteria, it was always likely that the
United States would moderate its opposition to the ICC given that they share many similar goals.
For example, the U.S. representative to the Security Council has said that “[s]trengthening the
global system of accountability for the worst atrocities remains an important priority for the United
States” and described preventing mass atrocities as both a “core national security interest” of the
United States and a “moral responsibility.”141 These are also core goals of the ICC.142 Indeed,
President Obama has been considerably more supportive of the ICC than President Bush. For
example, the United States has argued in favor of Security Council action to support the ICC’s
investigations in Darfur,143 and the United States voted for the referral of the situation in Syria to
the ICC.144
Moreover, the United States has also worked behind the scenes to support the ICC. The
United States is an active participant in meetings of the Assembly of States, it transferred ICC
indictee Bosco Ntaganda to the court after he surrendered himself to the U.S. Embassy in Kigali,
and the United States has deployed military advisers to help search for members of the Lord’s
Resistance Army who have been indicted by the ICC.145 Professor Kaye has described the United
States as having a “close working relationship” with the court,146 although the recent self-referral
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by Palestine147 may cause tension in that relationship.148 Ultimately, the goals of the United States
and the ICC are broadly aligned, but the United States has reservations about the existence of a
truly independent international court that could constrain its conduct or indict its nationals. Given
that the potential for ICC constraints on U.S. action would be greatest if the United States became
a party to the Rome Statute,149 it seems unlikely that the United States will join the ICC in the
foreseeable future.
The United States does not fit neatly into Professor Bosco’s framework. While it had a
program of active marginalization under President Bush, it now broadly supports the objectives of
the court, which makes it seem like it accepts the court in some key ways. At the same time, it is
committed to using its position on the Security Council to prevent the court from obtaining
jurisdiction over U.S. nationals,150 which looks like a control strategy. The United States thus
seems to shift between acceptance and control strategies depending on the issue. As a result, the
United States does appear to be qualitatively different from Russia and China, which appear to
simply be interested in controlling the court.
Russia has often blocked support for the ICC. At the same time, Russia claims to support
the goals of the ICC: “It is clear that persons guilty of particularly serious crimes under
international law must be brought before the Court.”151 What should one make of what Russia says

See “The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, opens a preliminary examination of the
situation in Palestine,” ICC Press Release dated Jan. 16, 2015, Doc. No. ICC-OTP-20150116-PR1083 (noting that the
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versus what it does? Russia attempts to justify its position by focusing on the relationship between
the court and the Council. So, for example, the Russian representative has noted the difficulty of
achieving “a proper balance between the interests of peace and punishing the guilty.”152 He has
also stressed the need for the Council and the court to “interact within the framework of their
respective mandates and with mutual respect.”153 There are legitimate debates about how to
balance peace and justice, but it seems more likely that Russia’s position is about power,
specifically the question of whether the ICC will be subordinate to the Security Council. Implicit
in the Russian position is a belief that the ICC should either be formally subordinated to the
Security Council154 or that, at the very least, the ICC should defer to the Security Council’s
leadership.155 Not coincidentally, this would give Russia an effective veto over ICC action by
virtue of its veto over Security Council action. All this suggests that Russia’s opposition to the
ICC is pragmatic rather than principled. It also suggests that Russia will sometimes support the
ICC and sometimes oppose it depending on whether it thinks ICC action advances Russian
interests.156 Russia is using a strategy of control rather than marginalization.
Of all the permanent members, China appears to be the only one with a principled
opposition to the ICC, although power concerns are also present. Historically, China has given
great weight to the principles of non-intervention and sovereignty.157 This has carried through to

152

Id. at 19.
Id.
154
See, e.g., Id. at 20 (suggesting that the ICC should not be able to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
“in the absence of a definition of aggression by the Security Council” and that “in the absence of a direct instruction,
Security Council resolutions do not abrogate the norms of general international law on the immunity of heads of State
in office”).
155
See, e.g., Id. at 19 (characterizing the ICC as a “new tool” that the Council can use in maintaining international
peace and security).
156
See Kaye, supra note 128, at 13 (noting that Russia is likely to take a “case-by-case approach” to the ICC that will
not depend particularly on principles of accountability and justice).
157
See, e.g., Chen Tiqiang, The People’s Republic of China and International Law, 8 DALHOUSIE L.J. 3, 23-25 (1984)
(describing Chinese support for the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, including “mutual respect for each other’s
territorial integrity and sovereignty” and “mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs”).
153

2016]

THE ICC AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

55

the present, with the Chinese representative to the Security Council stressing that the Council must
be guided in its work by the “fundamental principles of respect for national sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of States.”158 Thus, while China views the ICC as an “integral
part of the international system,” it believes that the ICC must also abide by the principles of nonintervention and sovereignty.159 This suggests that China will generally be supportive of or at least
ambivalent about the ICC’s work when a state has consented to the Court’s jurisdiction, but will
generally oppose the use of the Security Council to subject a state to the court’s jurisdiction against
its will.160
On the other hand, Professor Kaye suggests that concerns about non-interference and
sovereignty may be less relevant today than they have been in the past for China.161 Particularly
as China becomes more powerful militarily and politically, it may be less committed to a policy
of non-interference because of the constraints such a policy imposes on its freedom of action. As
with Russia and the U.S., there also appears to be a concern that a strong independent Court could
be a potential threat.162 Like Russia, China thinks the best solution to the potential difficulties
created by an independent ICC is to have the ICC defer to the Security Council.163 This would, of
course, give China an effective veto over ICC action. Ultimately, China will be predisposed to
oppose Security Council action that subjects a state to ICC jurisdiction against its will, although it
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will also factor in pragmatic considerations of how ICC action would affect its interests.164 Like
Russia, China seeks to control the court rather than accept it.165
The ICC can count on France and Britain to support it.166 They have both accepted the
ICC’s goals and methods. The ICC can also probably count on U.S. support on most issues, unless
it initiates a prosecution of a U.S. national, at which point the U.S. might shift back to a strategy
of active marginalization.167 By the same token, the ICC can probably count on Russia and China
to use their position as permanent members of the Security Council to try to control the court.168
This will mean that Russia and China will use their vetoes to protect themselves and their allies.
To the extent that the court is willing to defer to Russia and China’s interests in its selection of
situations to investigate, it could probably neutralize that opposition, but sacrificing its
independence would be anathema to the court, which is founded on the ideal of an “independent
permanent International Criminal Court . . . with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole.”169
VII.

WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR STATES TO SUPPORT THE ICC?

Throughout this Article, I have talked about whether states support the ICC. States are
described as supporting the ICC if their representatives call for supporting the court before the
Security Council. But what does it mean to support the ICC? Take, for example, the statement of
Chile during the Security Council debate that followed the Prosecutor’s announcement that she
was suspending investigations in Darfur. Chile’s representative reiterated his country’s “support
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See, e.g. ICC Charges Against Uhuru Kenyatta Defended by Ocampo supra note 78, at 4 (suggesting that China
has blocked action on Darfur, in part, because Sudan is an ally).
165
See Bosco, supra note 136, at 14-15.
166
See supra text accompanying notes 128-136.
167
See supra text accompanying notes 137-150.
168
See supra text accompanying notes 151-165.
169
See Rome Statute, Preamble.

2016]

THE ICC AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL

57

for the Court and for the work of its Prosecutor.”170 He urged the Prosecutor to continue
investigating potential crimes in Darfur, stressed the need for the Council to work with the Court
to ensure its success, and urged all states to cooperate with the Court.171 He did not, however, make
any concrete proposals for how to accomplish these goals. Nor is Chile alone. A number of states
made similar statements of general support that lacked any proposals for specific action.172
It is impossible to tell from Chile’s statement if it would support any particular initiatives
to put pressure on Sudan to cooperate with the court. It is possible that Chile would support
concrete action, but it is equally possible that its support for the ICC extends only to praising it
publicly. If the latter is true, then Chile’s support is empty. Unless states are willing to take some
concrete action that pressures Sudan to cooperate, it is unlikely that support for the court will
translate into success for the court. After all, even Russia and China have said they support the
ideas of justice and accountability in the abstract,173 even if in practice, they prevent the Security
Council from acting to effectuate those principles.174
Luckily, there have been a number of calls for the Security Council to take specific actions.
Looking at these can give us some sense of what states mean when they say they “support” the
ICC, as well as an idea of what actions the Council would likely take if the threat of a permanent
member veto was removed. The proposal that appears to have the most support is for the Security
Council to create a monitoring mechanism, most likely in the form of a permanent subsidiary body,
which would review state compliance with the Council’s ICC-related resolutions and recommend
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action the Council should take to achieve compliance. The creation of a formal monitoring
mechanism has been endorsed by a significant number of states.175
Another proposal that has significant support is for the United Nations to pay for the costs
of Security Council referrals. Both the Security Council resolution that referred the situation in
Darfur to the ICC and the draft resolution that would have referred the situation in Syria stated that
“none of the expenses incurred in connection with the referral . . . shall be borne by the United
Nations.”176 This was somewhat unexpected because the drafters of the Rome Statute had assumed
that the United Nations would pay for the expenses incurred by referrals. 177 Several states have
spoken against the Council’s refusal to pay for referrals. 178 In addition, a General Assembly
resolution was passed by consensus in 2014 that noted the need to fund the ICC’s “expenses related
to investigations and prosecutions” incurred as a result of “situations referred to the Court by the
Security Council.”179 The resolution was sponsored by sixty-six states and adopted by consensus
in the General Assembly.180
There also appears to be moderate support for a number of slightly stronger proposals. For
example, a number of states support a proposal that the Security Council should, as a matter of
course, impose targeted sanctions on individuals who have been indicted by the ICC.181 In addition,
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a number of countries have stated quite baldly that Sudan is in violation of its obligation to
cooperate with the Court in Resolution 1593.182 The logical consequence of this would be passage
of a second resolution declaring that Sudan has breached its legal obligations under Resolution
1593.
Several stronger proposals have also been made, but there appears to be weaker support
for these proposals. So, for example, France has proposed that the Council and the United Nations
adhere to a rule that would generally prohibit contact with anyone who has been indicted by the
ICC.183 A handful of other states also support this.184 The United Kingdom has proposed that all
future referrals by the Security Council should include a legally binding obligation on all states to
cooperate with the Court.185 The Netherlands supports this position.186 A small number of states
have also indicated that they would implement the arrest warrants if given the opportunity.187
Finally, Hungary has proposed the creation of “clear and public criteria” that the Security Council
would agree to follow in deciding both when to refer matters to the ICC and how to ensure
accountability for such referrals.188
The first thing to note is that a significant number of states have said on the record that they
would be willing to take concrete action to support the ICC. For most states, support does mean
more than just praising the ICC during public debates. Moreover, it is quite likely that some of the
states that took no position on particular proposals for action would nonetheless vote in favor of
them if given the opportunity. On the other hand, it is also noticeable that the stronger the proposal,
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the smaller the number of states willing to publicly endorse it. This suggests, unsurprisingly, that
states vary in the strength of the action they would take to support the ICC, with a large number
of states willing to take moderate action and a smaller number willing to take stronger action.
So, if the threat of a Russian or Chinese veto were lifted, what action could we expect the
Security Council to take? And what effect would it have, if any, on the success of the Court? There
is broad support for the creation of a formal body within the Security Council tasked with
monitoring compliance with ICC-related resolutions. It is unclear, however, how useful that would
be. At best, the monitoring body would be able to make recommendations to the Security Council.
It is unlikely that it would be empowered to take action on its own authority. Thus, it would not
lead automatically to concrete action. On the other hand, having formal recommendations for
action might make it more likely that the Council acted on those recommendations.
There also appears to be broad support for having the United Nations pay the costs of
Security Council referrals. This might well have permitted the Prosecutor to continue her
investigations in Darfur by providing the court with a dedicated funding source for those
investigations.189 But, of course, simply continuing the investigations does not seem to materially
increase the likelihood of success because Sudan would probably continue to block those
investigations.
There appears to be moderate support for implementing targeted sanctions against ICC
indictees and for a formal finding that Sudan is in violation of Resolution 1593. These steps would
put greater pressure on Sudan, although they would also be less likely to occur. There is a debate
about the utility of sanctions regimes, but in theory they apply pressure to the sanctioned
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individuals to comply with their obligations.190 A formal finding that Sudan was in violation of
Resolution 1593 would similarly put pressure on Sudan by highlighting its intransigence and
increasing its isolation in the international community. Of course, neither is likely to force Sudan
into cooperating overnight.
Only a few states publicly support the strongest proposals, but these are also the proposals
most likely to help the court succeed. Imposing a legal obligation on all states to cooperate with
the ICC through a Security Council resolution passed under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter would make it much harder for states to justify not arresting President Bashir if he could
be found in their territory. This would, in turn, make it much harder for him to travel and further
increase Sudan’s isolation. Similarly, a public commitment by states to arrest ICC indictees would
also serve to isolate President Bashir and apply pressure to his regime.
What is conspicuously missing is any proposal to use the Security Council’s powers under
Chapter VII of the Charter to authorize states to use force to arrest those indicted by the ICC. While
this would have the strongest potential impact on the court’s success, no state is willing to support
such a proposal. Moreover, even if it were adopted by the Security Council, it seems relatively
clear that no state would be willing to risk a confrontation with Sudan to enforce such a resolution.
Would any of these actions, assuming they were undertaken, improve the likelihood of the
Court’s success in Darfur? Counterfactual questions are impossible to answer with certainty. The
most likely steps (a formal monitoring mechanism and payment of referral costs by the UN) seem
to have the least chance of affecting Sudan’s decision-making. The next most likely steps (placing
ICC indictees on a sanctions list and formally finding that Sudan was in violation of Resolution
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1593) would certainly apply pressure to the Sudanese regime and isolate it internationally, but the
Sudanese regime has already survived years of international isolation. It is far from certain that
these acts would change matters. The least likely steps (for example, imposing a legal obligation
on all UN member states to arrest President Bashir) would arguably have the most impact, but
even complete isolation from the international community might not be sufficient to pressure the
Sudanese government to cooperate. On the other hand, sustained international pressure did cause
Serbia to reverse course and cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia,191 so we cannot say with certainty that these actions would have no effect. Ultimately,
the actions of a more democratic Security Council would probably increase the likelihood of the
court’s success in Darfur, although probably not by a large amount.
VIII. CONCLUSION
There are several conclusions one can draw from all of this. First, the ICC is weak when
compared to states. Even states that are themselves relatively weak and isolated, like Sudan, have
been able to frustrate the ICC.192 If the government simply refuses the ICC access to the country,
it becomes extremely difficult to conduct investigations.193 Moreover, prosecutions of senior
leaders inevitably need insider witnesses who can tie those leaders to the crimes that are occurring.
Governments are in an excellent position to apply pressure to such insiders to prevent them from
testifying.194 And, as the experience in Sudan has shown, the government can make it virtually
impossible for the court to obtain custody over the accused. After many years of trying, the
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Prosecutor has essentially admitted that the Darfur cases have reached a dead end as a result of
Sudanese obstruction.195
Second, when the ICC is investigating senior public officials in a state that actively opposes
the ICC’s work, as it has been in the situations in Darfur, Libya, and Kenya, the ICC cannot
succeed without the support of the international community. In these situations, the power
imbalance between the ICC and the state means that the ICC will have a difficult time. The targets
of the investigation will have a strong incentive to obstruct the investigation and can use the
resources of the state to accomplish that goal.196 To be successful, the ICC requires support from
other states who can apply pressure to the recalcitrant state to persuade it to cooperate.197 In theory,
one of the best venues for coordinating support for the ICC is the Security Council because it has
the authority to impose sanctions and other measures on a state that refuses to cooperate. In
practice, this has not worked because both Russia and China oppose strong Security Council
action.
Third, as much as the situation looks intractable now, there are ways that it could change.
A change in the Sudanese regime that brought to power a new government that was not so invested
in blocking the ICC action would change the situation radically. 198 As an example of this, Serbia
opposed the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) when Slobodan
Milošević was President. When a new government came to power, Serbia’s position changed and
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Milošević was sent to The Hague to be tried.199 Of course, this was partly a result of strong external
pressure by the United States and others to comply with the ICTY’s arrest warrants or face the loss
of international aid,200 which tends to support point two above about the necessity of international
support for international tribunals to be successful.
The other way the situation could change is by breaking the deadlock in the Security
Council. At the moment this looks unlikely. Russia and China are more interested in controlling
the ICC than empowering it, and one can reasonably expect them to continue to wield their vetoes
to protect their interests and their allies. However, that may not be the case forever. For a time in
the 1990’s, it seemed like Russia might align itself with the West. That seems less likely now, but
could change in the future as the current Russian system is probably unstable.201 China is already
deeply embedded in the current international order and is becoming ever more closely tied to it,202
and it may eventually transition to an electoral democracy.203 In the event that Russia and China
become liberal democracies, their strategies with regard to the court would probably shift from
control to acceptance. At that point, the likelihood of a permanent member veto would go down
dramatically.
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The fourth conclusion one can draw from the ICC’s experience in Darfur is that there is
broad support for ending impunity among the states of the world. As unlikely as an end to Security
Council paralysis seems right now, it is important to keep that paralysis in perspective. Opposition
to the ICC is narrow. It essentially boils down to two states that wield the veto. Support for the
ICC, on the other hand, is broad and deep. It is strong in Europe, North America, Central America,
and South America. There is still considerable support for the ICC in Africa, although there are
also critics. Finally, there is some support for the ICC in Asia, with both South Korea and Japan
supporting it.204 Many Asian states, however, appear to be on the sidelines – neither actively
supporting nor opposing the ICC.205 There is no continent that is overwhelmingly opposed to the
court. Should events occur that remove the threat of a Russian or Chinese veto, the Security
Council could move rapidly to support the ICC.
Fifth, it appears that many states would be willing to take concrete action to support the
ICC. If the threat of a Russian or Chinese veto was removed, the steps that would be both most
likely to occur and most useful would be for the UN to pay for the cost of referrals, for ICC
indictees to be put on the UN’s targeted sanctions lists, and for the Security Council to formally
find that Sudan is in breach of its obligations under Resolution 1593. While none of these would
guarantee success, collectively they would support the ICC while pressuring Sudan to cooperate.
A small number of states would favor even bolder action.
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I agree with much of what Professor Kontorovich has said about the ICC’s weakness
compared to states.206 It is true that the ICC, standing alone, has little chance of succeeding when
governments are willing to use the machinery of the state to oppose it. But despite the recent
failures in Kenya and Darfur, there is still reason to believe that the ICC can succeed. Of course,
it cannot succeed on its own and will need support from the international community, but this is
not as unlikely as Professor Kontorovich believes. He claims that the collapse of the Kenyatta case
in Kenya “shows that supposed international norms have not been ‘internalized’ by the
‘international community.’”207 I disagree. While there is opposition to the ICC, that opposition is
quite narrow and his claim that the international community has not internalized the norms of
international criminal justice does not seem to be true. Rather, an examination of recent debates
about the ICC shows that the majority of states do want an end to impunity and that many states
would be willing to take concrete action to further that goal. This bodes well for the eventual
success of the court.
States whose senior officials are under threat by the ICC are likely to be extremely
motivated to obstruct the ICC, while those states that support international criminal justice are
likely to be relatively diffuse in that support.208 There will also be spoilers like China and Russia
who see political or economic advantage in providing shelter to states like Sudan. 209 Thus,
paralysis may well be the norm for the short to medium term. On the other hand, the majority of
states do care about international criminal justice and ending impunity. Of course, it will rarely be
the only thing they care about and states will weigh their concern for justice against their other
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motivations when deciding how assertive to be in support of the ICC. But the fact that there is
broad support for ending impunity among the majority of nations suggests that the trend over time
will be towards greater enforcement. Or, to paraphrase Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., the evidence
suggests that the arc of history will bend towards justice.210
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